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Summary: This paper takes for granted the importance of the emerging 
European network economy, in which the new information technology 
generates a great deal of dynamics. The critical success factors for 
these emerging networks are described and illustrated by means of 
two Dutch case studies, viz., the Flower and Plants auction in 
Aalsmeer and Amsterdam Teleport. The paper concludes that strategie 
networks will be of critical importance for the future of Europe. 
/ 
\ 
3 
1. TOWARDS A EUROPEAN NETWORK ECONOMY. 
In the Treaty of Rome, which marks the beginning of the European 
Community, it has been agreed that transport infrastructure is critical 
for the economie progress in Europe and that, consequently, a common 
policy in this area would have to be pursued. 
This observation on the relevance of transport in Europe is not a 
misplaced remark. In f act transport has been a vehicle of major importance 
in the long history of Europe. Andersson and Strömquist (1988) speak in 
this context of four logistic revolutions which characterize economie 
history of Europe. Each of these logistic revolutions can be described by 
the emergence and adoption of a new type of international infrastructure: 
the period front the thirteenth century onward, in which water transport 
(inland and coastal transport) emerged as a new logistic system 
connecting cities along rivers and coastal areas (the so-called Hansa 
economy); 
the period from the sixteenth century, characterized by a drastic 
improvement in sailing and sea transport and by the introduction of new 
banking systems, through which trade to the East Indies and West Indies 
was stimulated (with Lisbon, Antwerp and Amsterdam as major centres); 
the period from the middle of the nineteenth century, marked by the 
Industrial Revolution, in which the invention of the steam engine 
generated new transport modes (sea transport, railways) which also 
created new market areas (e.g. North-America); 
the period from the seventies in our century, which is marked by 
informatization and flexibilization; in this framework JIT (just-in-
time) systems and MRP (material requirements planning) evolved; 
besides, the rapid developments in the area of communication technology 
generated also the emergence of integral logistics (see Giaoutzi and 
Nijkamp, 1988). 
The historical development of Europe based on a close connection 
between economie growth and development of transport logistics has 
ultimately induced the European network economy. Europe has become an 
interwoven, multi-faceted network system, and this network will become 
even more evident after the completion of the internal market (1992) and 
the integration of (parts of) Eastern Europe. And therefore it is no 
surprise that politically independent countries such as Sweden or Austria 
aim at an extension of their economie and logistieal links with Western 
Europe. Spatial interaction, geographical mobility and economie progress 
seem to be closely interwoven phenomena and seem to continue as major 
features of the European network economy, despite all environmental and 
social costs involved. Such networks are not only related to transnational 
connections (e.g., rapid trains), but also to nodal configurations (e.g., 
teleports). Our paper will mainly deal with the latter type of networks, 
but first a more general sketch will be given. 
Indeed, Europe is in motion. The action radius of commuting is 
structurally rising, the volume of commodities transported nationally and 
internationally is increasing, and the airlines activities for both 
passengers and commodities are booming. In a recent publication this 
mobility drift in Europe has been described as the 'Euro mobile' 
phenomenon (see Nijkamp et al., 1990). 
Transport policy favouring a free movement of persons and commodities 
in the EC is a sine qua non for a single market. The removal of barriers 
is of gr.eat importance for obtaining the highest dynamic integration 
benefits from a network economy. 
It is surprising to observe that in most European countries transport 
has exhibited clear signs of devolution (see Van Gent and Nijkamp, 1989). 
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This devolution appears to be a uniform phenomenon, although in various 
countries and cities it manifests itself in different forms, e.g., 
deregulation, decentralization and privatization. However, the first and 
most noticeable observation in the above mentioned study is that there is 
a striking parallel movement of transport policies. 
The previous remarks lead to various interesting observations. The 
most pronounced one being the surprising uniformity in the evolution of 
transport policies in most European countries in the past three decades: 
a period of expansion in the 1960s, a period of contraction in the 1970s 
and an era of selective expansion in the 1980s, in which the direction of 
selection is strongly governed by either market forces or by 
decentralization principles. Countries with a more liberal policy model 
and/or with severe deficits of the public budget are apparently the first 
ones to advocate privatization - in combination with deregulation - of 
transport policy, not only in the airlines sector and the freight sector, 
but also in the public transport sector. Clearly, among all these 
countries significant differences do still exist, as the intensity of 
economie stagnation and of monetarist policies may drastically vary. 
Similarly, in some countries local autonomy rather than privatization can 
be observed as a political ideology. Altogether, however, the hypothesis 
of a financially-driven deregulation ideology turns out to be reasonably 
valid in many European countries. 
A second observation to be made here is that European transport policy 
should not only be focussed on an improvement of the intra-EC network 
infrastructure, but that it should pay attention in particular to external 
links of this network. As mentioned before, an open EC has the highest 
benefit for both the Community itself and the world economy as a whole. 
Thus the improvement of cross-frontier routes are extremely important, 
such as the Trans-European Motorway, or the Scandinavian links. In the 
future also major links to East-European countries would have to be 
envisaged. There is also a good case here for cooperation between non-
member countries which provide (transit) links between EC-members, such as 
Switzerland, Austria and Yugoslavia. It goes without saying that a 
balanced transport policy is of critical relevance for regional 
equilibrium in the Community. The current tendency toward major fast links 
is not by definition beneficial to all regions. Extensive evaluation 
research would be necessary here to provide policy-makers with adequate 
guidelines. 
The major stimulus for new and advanced infrastructure policy is given 
by information technology (information, telecommunications and 
electronics). Physical distribution is increasingly relying on 
informaties-related activities. That holds true for containerization, fast 
trains and airlines. Accessible and internationally coordinated 
information systems are becoming a major vehicle for a further improvement 
of the transportation network in the Community. The International 
Transport Information System (INTIS) in the port of Rotterdam is a good 
example of this development. A necessary condition for further penetration 
and success of such information systems is standardization, and this 
policy issue is one of the most crucial corner stones of the European 
transport policy. JIT principles and multimodal logistic chains will never 
become fully operational without sufficiënt standardization. 
Finally, the development of new mega-infrastructures, such as the 
Channel Tunnel, the ICE, the TGV, mega-airports etc. have to be mentioned. 
From a transportation viewpoint this all looks promising; from an 
ecological viewpoint serious doubts may be raised. In a recent study we 
concluded that future transport needs are incompatible with ecological 
paradigms unless the possibilities of subterrean fast transport, e.g., 
based on vacuüm pipelines, would be taken much more seriously. Seen from 
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the current ecological perspective, it is not at all evident that modern 
large-scale infrastructures add to the social well-being and quality of 
life of the large agglomerations of the Community. Regional sustainable 
development will therefore be a major concern in the next decades (see 
also Archibugi and Nijkamp, 1989). 
2. INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKS AND CRITICAL SÜCCESS FACTORS. 
It is evident from the foregoing exposition that the European network 
economy will face difficult issues in terms of capacity and externalities 
in the next decades. Any expansion is financially expensive and 
environmentally disruptive. On the other hand, given the foreseeable needs 
of the European network economy, drastic improvements have to be realized 
in particular as various current transport modes are approaching the end 
of their life cycle (see also Marchetti 1987). 
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Fig. 1. Shares of types of transport modes in the USA (Marchetti, 1987). 
Two remarks have to be made regarding Marchetti's approach. Outdated 
transport modes may again become competitive, when they are upgraded by 
means of informaties (e.g., railways). And secondly, intermodal transport 
may lead to positive synergetic effects which go far beyond the potential 
of individual transport modes (e.g., combined transport like Huckepack or 
Rollende Landstrafien). 
Which strategie networks in Europe can be imagined for the next 
decades? At least five directions at a global European level seem to be 
viable here. 
- a rigorous introduction of informaties and telematics systems with the 
explicit aim to reduce physical transport; 
- a drastic change in our pattern of living and working (including the 
geographical dispersion of economie activities and residences); 
- an upgrading of existing transport modes towards a level that is 
compatible with the needs of the European network economy; 
- a qualitative structural change in transport and logistic systems by a 
far reaching combination of different transport modes; 
- the development of new transport modes (e.g., Maglev, 'iron highways', 
underground vacuüm pipelines for high speed trains etc). 
Clearly, at regional and local scales more specific networks may be 
needed. The development of such new strategie networks would not only 
serve to tackle ad hoc current local bottlenecks in transport 
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infrastructure, but also to design network infrastructure from the 
strategie perspective needed for the next century. It is evident that 
there is a serious lack of such strategie networks in the European context 
(see also Schippers 1990). 
The nature of such missing networks is difficult to identify by 
looking at the European map of existing physical networks. Such an 
approach would at best be valuable for tracing missing physical links 
between certain nodes. Essentially a qualitative rather than a 
quantitative analysis of such networks is needed. The relevant dimension 
in any strategie network is space, so that one would have to look for 
modal layers which are absent in the system - or not developed far enough 
(e.g. inland waterways) - or for struCtural impediments or barriers in 
existing networks. This means that essentially the quality of a network 
(including the existence of qualitative jumps at crossing points, e.g. 
borders) is of critical importance. Such qualities of a network may relate 
to the following pentagon of five dimensions of a network: 
hard ware (e.g. 
soft ware (e.g. 
org ware (e.g. 
fin ware (e.g. 
eco ware (e.g. 
efficiënt technological standardization); 
use of compatible information systems); 
existence of effective management structures) ; 
presence of financial institutions); 
environment-friendly systems). 
All these dimensions may be regarded as critical success factors for 
the design and operation of strategie networks. Such networks take thus 
for granted the need for spatial and economie interaction between 
countries and the critical role of infrastructures played in this 
development. From the Japanese side this awareness has even led to the 
creation of the GIF (Global Infrastructure Fund) concept in order to 
provide a satisfactory platform for financing large-scale public works 
which are compatible with environmental impediments (cf. Saito 1990). 
In the sequel of this paper two Dutch case studies will briefly be 
discussed in order to illustrate the fact that designing successful 
infrastructure networks is not merely a question of investing a certain 
amount of money in physical hard ware configurations. On the contrary, 
the main conclusion of this paper is that the success of infrastructure 
networks is based on sufficiënt care for all five dimensions of networks. 
In a much broader European study for the European Round Table of 
Industrialists (see NECTAR, 1990) this conclusion is further elaborated. 
From that study, it becomes clear that even the feasibility of new 
infrastructure networks is increasingly being hampered by insufficiënt 
care for a number of these dimensions. We may mention the financing 
problems in the case of the Channel Tunnel between England and France, and 
the strong resistence in most countries against building new roads and 
tunnels (e.g., in the Netherlands) and railway lines (Kent, Flanders). 
Those five dimensions are therefore of strategie importance for 
infrastructure networks. 
The first case study describes the critical success factors of the 
world-wide operating information system of the flower and plants auction 
in Aalsmeer (the Netherlands) and the second one to the critical success 
factors of the Teleport (new telematics centre) project in Amsterdam. 
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3. THE FLOWER AND PLANTS AUCTION (VBA) IN AALSMEER. 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter the physical distribution and services network of the 
world's largest flower and plants auction VBA ("Verenigde Bloemenveilingen 
Aalsmeer") is described in terms of its critical success factors in the 
fields of org-, hard-, soft-, fin- and ecoware. A number of examples 
illustrate these critical success factors. The VBA and its competitors are 
of strategie importantance for both the national economy and for the 
international trade in flowers and plants. 
3.1.1. Historical background 
The VBA network which has nowadays a world wide coverage in terms of 
distribution and logistics was the result of a merger in 1972 between two 
former competitors, one of which was established in 1912. The merger was 
needed because of the rapidly growing market and concentration activities 
at the demand side of the market. Since the two organizations matched 
perfectly, a merger appeared to be rational. The VBA is a co-operation of 
some 4.500 growers and employs some 1.550 persons with a solid tenure 
(including part-timers) and a few hundred temporary workers. 
3.2. Orgware 
The services configuration of the VBA include the following: 
(1) the auction - by means of an auction clock - of flowers and plants 
from all over the world. The main goal of the VBA is 'to supply 
services in order to attain the highest possible prices for the 
products of its members'. This goal can only be achieved if the 
highest possible concentration of customers and growers is found at 
the VBA, resulting in stable, transparent pricing and trade 
relations. The auction system would not work if large quantities of 
products were sold outside the auction. This is why the VBA uses an 
auction duty for its members. 
The VBA uses the concept of quality maximization ("kweker-
specialisatie") in stead of outlet maximization - which is common in 
the USA. Quality refers here to workers, machines and products. 
(2) the supply of temporary storage accomodation for customers; 
(3) intermediate services in direct transactions between growers and 
customers; 
(4) computerized administration of transactions; 
(5) education programmes for growers as part of the quality maximization 
concept; 
(6) phyto-sanitarian services (quarantaine, gassing); 
(7) well-balanced promotion of the interests of all three parties in the 
co-operation (growers, workers and customers) ("samenwerkings-
gedachte"); 
(8) communication in terms of time and close attention for the growers, 
top-down as well as bottom-up (as part of the quality maximization 
concept) ("kwaliteitskringen"). The actual large scale organization 
is thereby "scaled down"; 
(9) flexible and fast adaptation to new chances and challenges. Recent 
plans include additional floor space of some 50 percent. 
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Recent developments include: 
(1) formation of product divisions for plants and flowers separately in 
response to the growing differences between the two markets; 
(2) service segmentation into auction, intermediate services and 
super market; 
(3) risk distribution by means of supplying an increasing number of 
markets. 
External institutional developments are also very important for the 
VBA. We mention here: 
(1) the EEC-treaty in 1950 - in fact a purely agricultural treaty - which 
has led to an enormous market growth. It is interesting to note, that 
the EC 1992 may be seen as a great chance by the VBA; 
(2) the role of Dutch agricultural policy in terms of providing and 
financing high level agricultural education, research (the famous 
Agricultural University in Wageningen), advisory services (starting 
with the Marshall plan; IMAG etc); 
(3) the role of a subsidy programme to stimulate investment in energy 
saving (when the gas prices where very high); 
(4) the merger of 1972 which led to a growth of the Dutch market share 
from 39 to 43-44 procent and to price stabilization; 
(5) mergers and take-overs by large, financially strong, non-industry 
firms. These firms may simply buy lacking knowledge, and thereby 
becoming strong competitors. The auction clock however, will 
incapsulate this peril. 
3.3. Hardware 
This feature of the network includes the heart of the VBA, the auction 
clock. Next to this relatively 'old' system modern computer equipment is 
used. 
All services are housed in the largest building in the world - 335.000 
m2; about 60 soccer fields. lts site is perfectly situated and attainable 
by main highways in all directions (e.g. to the FRG) and nearby Schiphol 
Airport. 
The actual transportation of flowers and plants is undertaken by 
specialized transport firms. In the years before the second World War 
small and low boats were mainly used, whereas after World War II trucks, 
cars and airplanes are used. In this way both transport speed and 
transport quantity grew strongly. Since fast transport is essential for 
these vulnerable goods, the product quality was also improved. 
3.4. Software 
Yearly investments in computers and logistics are some 20 min D/l. 
and 2.4 mld D/l. (20 percent of the 12 mld. D/l. production value) , 
respectively. Recently Tele-VBA, a Videotext-like information service 
distributing information such as auction prices, product quality, 
education programmes etc. - was introduced to the growers. 
3.5. Finware 
The co-operative - non-profit - basis of the VBA has a number of 
positive consequences for the financing of its members. A financial 
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surplus may be used to bail customers and growers, thereby eliminating 
individual risks and costs and maximizing funding for the development of 
products and markets. Investments in storage capacity are neither 
necessary because they may be hired for free. 
3.6. Ecoware 
Investments in R&D has led inter alia to the development of 
cultivation on glass wool, thereby eliminating the need for dangerous 
pesticides and nevertheless improving product quality. Investments in 
energy saving in heating and lighting systems should als be mentioned. 
In the following section a number of examples is given to illustrate 
the crucial importance of critical success factors for the VBA network. 
3.7. Creative and Innovative Adaptation to Chances and Challenges 
3.7.1. Growing competition of LDC's 
A number of countries in the world - including Kenia - have the 
agricultural and socio-economic (low wages, high employment) potentials 
to become strong competitors for the VBA. Kenia receives also EC 
subsidies. lts lack of highly trained workers however, have led to the 
production of only low quality products (the so-called commodities). A too 
high supply of the same type of product leads to price cuts until prices 
do no longer match transportation costs, thereby eliminating this 
'oversupply'. 
3.7.2. Product innovation by another major Dutch competitor 
In Naaldwijk (in the so-called Westland) the major Dutch competitor is 
situated. Next to the traditional production of commodities (with a low 
value added) and vegetables the production of specialities (high quality 
products with a high value added) is becoming popular in Naaldwijk. As in 
the case of Kenia, growers lack the specific product knowledge at this 
moment. This knowledge might be bought however, e.g. by attracting VBA 
members by means of attractive financial arrangements. 
3.7.3. Customer wishes: segmentation of services 
Two major developments at the demand side should be mentioned: 
(1) large customers such as supermarkets asking for very large quantities 
to be delivered at short notice and at special prices; 
(2) small customers asking for fast and efficiënt service. 
Since both developments may lead to price distortion, extra costs etc. 
and necessary 'tailor made' services were impossible in the auction 
system, a separate agency was set up for large customers and a cash & 
carry-system for small ones ("CULTRA", which uses a 12 procent provision 
to keep the auction system attractive). At a later date small customers 
will be serviced at two small auctions - with whom the VBA is already 
merged. Larger customers may than be serviced more efficiently. 
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3.7.4. Opening the Japanese market 
The Japanese are notorious for their ingenious system of excluding 
foreign competition from their home market. Their distribution system, for 
instance, is small scale, but therefore inefficiënt and expensive and 
firmly tied to specific suppliers. Complicated import laws and time 
consuming import inspection procedures do the rest. 
Flowers for instance should be fully free of any animal life and bulbs 
be breeded until flowers come out. In this way they are of course 
completely unsellable. 
By means of improvement of production processes the VBA was able to 
match the Japanes standards. On site inspection at the VBA by Japanese 
examinors is now regular. Training programs included visits to Japan. 
3.7.5. Developing the home market 
Super markets make up a new market. By means of the so-called "shop-
in-shop" system especially trained personnel may sell higher quality 
flowers and plants. This market is growing rapidly. 
3.7.6. Miscellaneous factors 
Other factors include: 
(1) tradition, of which the auction clock is a good example; 
(2) the lack of a good substitute for the auction clock; 
(3) the Dutch climate, whith its ideal summers, whereas e.g. in Spain the 
hot summers tend to burn every product. 
3.7.7. Conclusions 
The unique combination of a large number of success factors 'in one 
hand' and the way in which the VBA-management, its work force and its 
growers use and closely monitor these factors to stay competitive is 
responsible for the success of the VBA and makes it hard to beat. 
This network may be qualified as high-tech in all its dimensions. 
4. AMSTERDAM TELEPORT 
4.1. Introduction; Globalizing Business Competition 
Business competition nowadays is becoming of a globalized nature. In 
this concept settlement places are competing at world-scale to attract and 
to hold (these) firms. Competitiveness in this respect includes e.g. a 
well-trained workforce, a nice place to live, a minimum market size and 
certainly well-equiped infrastructure networks. Cities are then the most 
likely settlement place for most f irms. In this chapter we will take a 
close look at the development of the telematics network Amsterdam 
Teleport. But first we will explain the specific reasons of the city of 
Amsterdam for developing this project; they explain why this network might 
be called 'strategie'. To illustrate the power of the critical success 
factors of this network, a number of implementation problems is described. 
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4.1.1. Working and Living in Amsterdam 
Most of the employment in Amsterdam may be found in the services 
sectors. Because of various reasons other sectors - especially the large 
shipbuilding and steel industry - are insignificant nowadays. A large part 
of the harbours is therefore unused. A great deal of the services sectors 
have moved away from the city centre to the south-east periphery because 
of the lack of accessibility, parking problems and a shortage of 
tailormade buildings in the city centre. Since these locations have been -
and are in rapid pace - built around motorways, public transport has a 
low density and a large number of workers is commuting - because of the 
lack of nice and affordable houses in Amsterdam -, car use is very high 
and causing high congestion at the main points of entry of the road 
network of the city of Amsterdam. 
The inner city telecommunication infrastructure with its limited 
capacity and low quality (copper) telephone network is another reason why 
these firms 'moved abroad'. 
For the inner city and its surrounding areas this 'drain' involves 
serious economie and social problems. The Teleport project - as we will 
see - has the potential to 'revitalize' these areas. This network may then 
become of strategie importance for the city of Amsterdam in attracting new 
firms and stopping existing ones from moving elsewhere. Its importance 
however lies not only in its contribution to the local economy, but -
perhaps even more important - in its contribution to the national economy 
- given the dominant position of the city of Amsterdam in the Randstad -
and the European level - given the importance of Schiphol and the 
Amsterdam harbour, and the fact that this Teleport may become one chain in 
the foreseen world-wide network of teleports. 
4.2. The Project Amsterdam Teleport: Hard-, Soft-, Org-, Fin- and Ecoware 
4.2.1. Hardware 
Amsterdam Teleport is in terms of physical planning a new business 
district in Amsterdam at a short distance of the inner city, combining 
offices and business buildings with high-tech telematics infrastructure, 
expensive houses and 'green beits'. It is located around the recently 
built (bus-, tramway- and train) station Sloterdijk, in the former Western 
Harbour Area and accessible via main roads. 
The telematics infrastructure include the basic PTT-package, with 
options like telefax, memocom, PABX (digital telephone communication), 
direct satellite communication, computer data cables, special telephone 
tariffs, connection to the growing fiber glass telephone network of 
Amsterdam etc. Cost saving facility management is als possible. 
Amsterdam Teleport is in fact a pilot project for the very large 'IJ-
bank-project' near the Central Railway station. 
The attractiveness of this project in terms of accessibility may be 
further illustrated by means ot the so-called 'Three-harbour-concept'. 
This concept includes the following; a direct access to public transport 
junctions, motorways next to the Western Harbour (sea- and inland 
transport; the second Dutch harbour) and the international airport of 
Schiphol (the fourth in Europe for goods transportation) by both road and 
rail. Passenger transport by rail especially is very competitive. 
The Western Harbour itself is part of a revitalizing process, since 
the Eastern Harbour will be transformed into a large living district 
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('New-East'). Firms are therefore transferred to the Western Harbour. The 
Dutch Railways NS for instance has laid off its large but unused and old 
fashioned shunting-yard 'De Rietlanden' and built a modern high capacity 
equivalent in this harbour. The station Sloterdijk is also a remake of an 
old but much smaller station with the same name near its current location. 
The project has a number of goals. We may name the f ollowing 
indicators: 
(1) a floor space of 500.000 m2; 
(2) 20.000 work places; 
(3) 20 % 'green belt', lanes in stead of 'free building' etc. 
(4) project time (1995-2000) and occupied area (in % ) ; 
(5) attracting four different types of firms: 
a) head quarters, because of its marketing effect; 
b) small 'telematics-intensive firms'; 
c) middle-sized offices with 'standing' and image; 
d) small firms needing both office and (clean) (high-tech) production 
facilities. 
4.2.2. Soft- and orgware . 
Amsterdam Teleport is developed by means of a Public Private 
Partnership (PPS) between the city of Amsterdam (ground, physical 
planning, public works), PTT-Telecom and V0M (real estate management). 
Periodic consultations include also the Netherlands Railways. One alderman 
of the city of Amsterdam is responsible for the management of the public 
services. 
The physical planning of this area is done by flexible planning in 
stead of the usual time-consuming and fixed planning arrangements. 
4.2.3. Finware 
The funding of the project is a mixture of local public capital and 
private capital from insurance and pension funds and firms themselves. 
4.2.4. Ecoware 
Ecoware is also an important component of this project. We may mention 
the 'green belt' and the attraction of high-tech, but clean production 
firms. 
In the following section a number of implementation problems are 
described in order to illustrate the importance of the critical success 
factors. 
4.2.5. Implementation problems 
4.2.5.1. Separation of management and realization of telematics services 
At the start of the project management was the responsibility of the 
main quarters of PTT-Telecom in The Hague, while its realization was the 
responsibility of PTT-Telecom Amsterdam, resulting in very long 
communication lines and seed financing problems. The Teleport-organization 
itself was then blamed by its potential customers. 
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The privatization of PTT-Telecom was used to renegotiate the project 
agreement, thereby streamlining its functioning and potential to attract 
both customers and investers. 
4.2.5.2. Poor acquisition and marketing 
Since in practice all three partners were doing the acquisition and 
marketing, rivalry and confusing disattracted potential customers and 
investers. The forementioried renegotiation of the project agreement gave 
the VOM (estate management) the sole responsibility for this part of the 
project. 
4.2.5.3. Lagging demand 
Not until some one-and-halve years ago demand for locations in 
Teleport was lagging far behind schedule. The city of Amsterdam explains 
this phenomenon by the filling up of alternative locations in South-east 
and Amstel III and EC-1992 ("Fortress Europe"). 
4.3. The Success of the Project 
The network might be qualified as successfull, since recent figures 
indicate a faster than scheduled distribution of grounds and attraction of 
important telematics-oriented firms, including foreign firms. Grounds 
exploitation has led to very positive results. 
It should be noted however, that most of these firms were already 
present in Amsterdam, so that the unemployment figures may not become 
lower because of this project. 
The scheduled number of parking places was also too low. The excellent 
public transport facilities in all directions are obviously not so 
attractive as was initially expected. 
4.4. Recent Developments 
A number of recent developments may reduce the (future) success of 
this sophisticated network. We may mention: 
(1) chemical pollution of grounds, leading to higher land use costs and 
slower pace of land allocation. Housing construction might be legally 
impossible; 
(2) a lower rate of expected use of alternative locations in Amsterdam, 
thereby reducing the need for locations at Teleport; 
(3) future implementation of new, but traversing and noisy, railway 
extensions in the heart of Teleport, thereby reducing its 
attractiveness. 
4.5. Conclusions and Evaluation 
A complex of critical success factors is responsible for the current 
success of this network. Initial failures were especially due to org ware 
problems. Next to these problems however, an external factor, viz., the 
market situation, did also play its role. Its recent success depends 
therefore both on the market situation (booming) and changes in the 
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project organization. 
5. CONCLÜDING REMARKS 
Europe is in motion, politically, economically and spatially. In the 
past decade the European transport map has featured a wide variety of 
problematic developments at both local/regional and national/international 
scales. Despite the increasing popularity of Just-in-Time (JIT) systems 
and related concepts, the actual practice of both commodity and passenger 
transport is disappointing and often frustrating. Severe traffic 
congestion phenomena at the urban or metropolitan level (e.g., Athens, 
Rome, Paris), unacceptable delays in medium and long distance transport 
during peak hours, unsatisfactory service levels of European railway 
systems (and public transport in general), unreliable airline connections 
due to limited airport capacity and slow technical and institutional 
renewal of air traffic control in Europe; all these phenomena illustrate 
the difficult position of the European transport sector. And there is no 
clear perspective for a drastic improvement of this situation. On the 
contrary, it is increasingly claimed that a free European market (beyond 
the year 1992) and a further deregulation of the European transport sector 
may lead to unacceptable accessibility conditions in major regions in 
Europe. Another important complicating factor will be environmental 
policy. In contrast to the deregulation with respect to the pure transport 
market phenomena, environmental policy is critically dependent on a great 
deal of regulations. In particular, technical restrictions are likely to 
be imposed, e.g. limited emission levels of motorcars or even a 
prohibition of the use of certain transport modes. 
Transport policy makers in most European countries find themselves in 
extremely complicated situations. A large number of interest groups, 
ranging from multi-national companies to local environmentalists, urges 
them to take action, however often in quite different directions. On the 
one hand it has become obvious that the environment poses its limits on 
the volume, the character and the pace of the extension of the transport 
infrastructure. On the other hand most companies in (Western) Europe are 
concerned about their competitiveness in a global context due to 
inadequate infrastructure. 
The inadequate infrastructure might hit European business in several 
ways. First, the relatively slow development of sophisticated 
telecommunication infrastructure in Europe may curtail the industries in 
the possibilities to offer new services. Moreover it may limit the 
possibilities to speed up international trade in a reliable way. Secondly, 
the restricted capacity of inland transport networks may cause higher 
production costs levels in Europe. However, the last item should not be 
overstated as regards global competitiveness. For instance, also Japan 
suffers from heavy congestion on inland transport systems. Although, it 
should be admitted that Japan invests heavily in (high-speed) railway 
infrastructure and other rapid mass transit alternatives. 
In this report the results of two case studies on critical success 
factors of strategie international networks in the Netherlands were 
presented. From these studies a number of interesting conclusions may be 
drawn. The most important one being the fact that there does not seem to 
exist a single major critical success or failure factor for networks. On 
the contrary, success or failure of networks tends to be a multi-
dimensional phenomenon, since not only the hard-, the soft- and the org 
ware of networks should be dealt with, but also and increasingly their 
fin- and eco ware. Planning should therefore stress the importance of all 
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these factors and not just one (usually the quantity of the physical 
infrastructure). Planning should also take good notice of the 
interrelation between other policies (e.g., physical planning and housing) 
and the quality of networks. 
Close attention and concerted action between government and interested 
parties might reveal a large potential for successful networks with 
strategie value for the European network economy. 
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